It's the end of the world as we know it... and We Feel Fine.

Revolution Asset Management

April 2026

5-minute read

Seeing the recent media headlines, one could be forgiven for thinking private credit is facing its end-of-the-world moment. The current media commentary has been dominated by rising default fears, valuation and redemption pressures, and warnings that the asset class is being tested for the first time in its modern form. The tone is urgent and unmistakably negative.

This brings to mind the popular band, R.E.M.'s, 1987 release It's the End of the World as We Know It - a rapid fire sequence of alarming imagery that sounds like chaos unfolding in real time. However, as Michael Stipe (lead singer of R.E.M.) reminds us in the chorus... "I feel fine".

The contrast reflects what Revolution Asset Management (Revolution) is experiencing in today's private credit market. While the noise and volatility are real and persistent, so too are disciplined deployment, conservative underwriting, a deliberate focus on non cyclical sectors, a refusal to chase yield (and risk), and experience driven portfolio construction which continues to underpin resilience.

Why US Centric Developments Are Shaping Global Private Credit Sentiment

There is no denying that parts of the global private credit market are under pressure. Much of the negative press is driven by developments in the U.S., where the asset class has grown rapidly over the past decade and where stress is now emerging in specific segments. This includes the so-called "SaaSpocalypse", redemption and liquidity pressures or rising default fears.

In the U.S., private credit has had significant exposure to software and technology borrowers, alongside the widespread adoption of covenant lite structures that emerged during a prolonged period of strong inflows into the private credit segment. Additionally, general lending terms continued to weaken, and lenders were extending higher leverage, simultaneously. Over time, vulnerabilities that were already embedded in parts of the U.S. private credit market, such as higher opening leverage, aggressive EBITDA adjustments, covenant-lite structures and focusing on growth rather than cash flow generation were exposed, and some of those structures have now come under strain. Selective defaults, payment in kind interest, and amendments to loan terms have naturally attracted attention.

As Mike Tyson once said: "Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face". In the current environment, rapid deployment and relaxed processes work - until they don't. In this credit cycle, the consequences could be more severe, with recoveries potentially lower due to higher opening leverage and weaker underwriting standards.

This narrative has been amplified by publicly traded vehicles. Share price volatility, widening discounts to net asset value, and a handful of high profile credit events have made for compelling headlines. But these headlines, by their nature, compress nuance and often extrapolate localised issues into broad conclusions about an entire asset class.

The Reality: Dispersion, Not Deterioration

Beneath the surface, the private credit landscape is showing dispersion rather than systemic weakness. Performance outcomes are diverging based on underwriting standards, sector exposures, portfolio construction, and manager experience.

Portfolios built with aggressive leverage assumptions, heavy exposure to smaller companies and cyclical earnings, or generally poor underwriting standards are more exposed to investor sentiment and market ructions. By contrast, private lenders that prioritised downside protection, with conservative structures, and focused on borrower cash flow stability are experiencing more stable outcomes.

This is not unusual. Credit cycles have always been periods where discipline is revealed and rewarded.

What about the "SaaSpocalypse"?

SaaS (Software as a Service) companies that were previously considered market darlings, have also come under pressure as investors fear the potential impacts of AI disrupting traditional SaaS business models.

For context, U.S. private credit portfolios and Business Development Companies typically contain quite material software and technology exposures (generally in the order of 20-30%). This compares to the single-digit-percentage of the Australian private credit market being in the software segment, with literally a handful of names, which are commonly referred to as "mission critical".

Additionally, the concept of Annual Recurring Revenue, while foreign in Australia, is commonplace in the U.S., where private lenders provide funding based not on EBITDA and cash flow, but how fast their revenue is growing. As was recently outlined in the article: AI, Software, and Private Credit: Separating Credit Risk from Market Noise , not all software companies are created equally. This emphasised that the more well-known Australian mission-critical software providers have significant moats around their business in terms of the degree of embeddedness in their customer operations as well as already incorporating AI within their platforms to enhance their offering. Additionally, the Australian software companies in the private credit space are also considered platforms rather than applications, further adding to their embedded and more defensive nature.

Set against Australia's more conservative lending framework and historically strong equity buffers, this means that while enterprise values may be lower than they were even a few months ago, a substantial layer of equity protection remains in place for senior lenders. In this structure, equity absorbs valuation pressure first, with credit impacts only emerging after a significant erosion of equity value.

Why Private Credit Looks Different in Australia and New Zealand

Importantly, Australia does not map neatly into the U.S. private credit narrative.

Australian private credit has developed along a very different path, shaped by market structure, regulation, and borrower behaviour, with Australian private credit focusing more on conservative structures, asset backed strategies, and businesses with tangible cash flows.
Several structural differences include:

• Leverage levels are generally lower. Australian borrowers have historically operated with more conservative balance sheets. Lending structures often reflect this, with stronger covenants, lower leverage multiples, and a clearer emphasis on cash flow coverage rather than financial engineering.
• Sector exposure is different. The Australian market has far less concentration in technology and software businesses that dominate U.S. private credit portfolios. Instead, private lending is more commonly directed toward non cyclical industries such as consumer staples, infrastructure adjacent businesses, healthcare, and asset backed opportunities where revenues and cash flows are more consistent across economic cycles.
• Underwriting culture is more relationship driven. Australian private credit has grown without the same scale of syndicated deal flow seen in the U.S. This has reinforced a focus on deep due diligence (that typically extends to 4-6 weeks in Australia, as opposed to mere days in the U.S.), direct borrower engagement, and structures designed to hold through cycles rather than rely on refinancing windows, with significant equity buffers typically of the magnitude of 40-60% of the total capital structure.
• Australia's regulatory environment further underpins resilience. Unlike the U.S., where private credit operates with relatively light statutory oversight, Australia's market is overseen by a proactive securities and investments regulator in ASIC. In Report 814 Private Credit in Australia (REP 814) commissioned by ASIC, the authors acknowledged private credit's role in complementing the banking system when "done well", and in Report 820 Private credit surveillance: retail and wholesale funds (REP 820) ASIC reinforced that it will pursue enforcement where standards fall short. The message is unambiguous: private credit is supported in Australia, but only where governance, transparency and prudence are maintained.

For these reasons, applying U.S centric conclusions to Australian portfolios risks missing what matters on the ground.

Stability through volatility, not dependent on optimism

Against this backdrop, Revolution's portfolio positioning has been deliberate. Capital deployment has consistently prioritised credit discipline, with a focus on structure, security and borrower quality. Revolution has concentrated on non cyclical industries with stable demand drivers and resilient cash flows, diversified across the Australian and New Zealand private credit landscape, allowing the investment team to be selective and find the best relative value in markets they know well.

Patient capital has also been a defining advantage through this period of volatility. By structuring funds with long�'dated capital and conservative liquidity settings, Revolution does not become a forced seller when markets dislocate. Instead, Revolution acts deliberately at moments when others cannot. As market volatility has increased, pockets of the private credit market have experienced liquidity�'driven selling, particularly from vehicles managing redemptions or facing near�'term funding constraints. These situations are rarely driven by a deterioration in underlying asset quality, but by the need to raise liquidity. For private credit managers with patient capital, this creates opportunity. The ability to acquire high�'quality loans, often at discounts, creates opportunities to deploy capital at more compelling risk�'adjusted returns. This dynamic reinforces why stability through volatility matters, not just defensively, but as a source of long�'term return generation.

Revolution has encountered cycles like this before. Periods of rising interest rates, tightening liquidity, and heightened scrutiny are not new. What changes from cycle to cycle is who is prepared for them. Rather than viewing volatility as a signal to retreat, Revolution sees this as a natural phase of the credit cycle, one that reinforces the value of conservative underwriting, patience, and manager experience.

Amid the market noise, discipline and resilience prevails

When R.E.M. sang It's the End of the World as We Know It, they weren't singing about ignoring risk or pretending chaos does not exist. It is about perspective. Amid the noise, there is a calm recognition that not everything unfolding is unexpected and not everything is catastrophic.

The private credit landscape today is undergoing a healthy process of differentiation. Strong portfolios are distinguishing themselves from weaker ones. Structural discipline will be rewarded. And markets are once again reminding participants that credit is, ultimately, about risk management rather than return maximisation.

While headlines may stay dramatic and volatility may persist, private credit lenders with resilient portfolios especially in markets like Australia and New Zealand, with materially different fundamentals to the U.S., remain well positioned.

The world may sound like it is ending, but from where we sit, we feel fine.

Funds operated by this manager:

Revolution Private Debt Fund II , Revolution Wholesale Private Debt Fund II - Class B

Important Information

This information is for wholesale and professional investors only and has been prepared by Revolution Asset Management Pty Ltd ACN 623 140 607 AFSL 507353 ('Revolution'). Channel Investment Management Limited ACN 163 234 240 AFSL 439007 ('CIML') is the trustee and issuer of units for the Revolution Private Debt Fund II, Revolution Wholesale Private Debt Fund II (collectively 'the Funds'). Channel Capital Pty Ltd ACN 162 591 568 AR No. 001274413 ('Channel') provides investment infrastructure and distribution services for Revolution and is the holding company of CIML. FundRock NZ Limited is the issuer of units in the Revolution Private Debt PIE Fund (NZD) (the 'NZ Fund'). Public Trust is the independent trustee of the Scheme of the NZ Fund. Revolution is the appointed Investment Manager for the NZ Fund. Refer to fundrock.com/fundrock-new-zealand for more information. The NZ Fund is intended for the exclusive use of wholesale investors, as defined by the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013. This information is supplied on the following conditions which are expressly accepted and agreed to by each interested party ('Recipient').

This information contains general financial product advice only and has been prepared without taking into account the objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular person. It is intended solely for wholesale clients (including sophisticated investors) as defined under sections 761G and 761GA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Revolution is not licensed in Australia to provide financial product advice or other financial services to retail investors.

The information provided should not be considered personal advice, a recommendation, or an offer to invest in the Funds. Recipients should not rely on this information in making investment decisions. A Recipient should, before making any investment decisions, consider the appropriateness of the information, and seek professional advice.

Neither Revolution, Channel, CIML, FundRock NZ Limited or their representatives and respective employees or officers (collectively, 'the Beneficiaries') make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to accuracy, reliability or completeness of this information or subsequently provided to the Recipient or its advisers by any of the Beneficiaries, including, without limitation, any historical financial information, the estimates and projections and any other financial information derived there from, and nothing contained in this information is, or shall be relied upon, as a promise or representation, whether as to the past or the future. All investments contain risk. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

For further information and before investing, please read the Information Memorandum available on request.

When the Map Changes Mid-Journey

Alphinity Investment Management 

April 2026

4-minute read

The macro has taken over. Here's how we're navigating it

Markets don't wait for certainty. They reprice the expectation.

After a strong run into February 2026, led by Materials and Banks, two of the most economically sensitive corners of the Australian market, the landscape has shifted quickly. The Middle East conflict has moved markets from micro to macro almost overnight, raising a familiar and uncomfortable question: what happens to growth from here?

The short answer is that it likely slows; certainly, from what expectations were only a few months ago. The longer answer depends heavily on one man, and as anyone watching closely will attest, predicting Trump in the space of a single news cycle is ambitious, never mind longer term.

The Australian backdrop is more complicated than most

Australia entered this period with a problem most markets didn't have to the same extent: a persistent lift in underlying inflation that had already forced the RBA's hand. Two rate rises into a new cycle, and central bank credibility was already being tested. Consumer confidence had begun to wobble, and spending was pulling back even before the uncertainty and inflation caused by the war was a risk.

Now layer on a material rise in petrol prices, supply-side shocks across energy and key commodities, and growing uncertainty about where this end -- and you have a consumer likely under genuine pressure.

The RBA finds itself in a difficult position. Raise rates further to fight inflation and you risk choking an already potentially slowing economy. Hold and you risk losing the inflation fight altogether. Neither is comfortable. This is the definition of a stagflationary environment, and the risks are starker in Australia than in many developed markets that this takes hold. The Federal Government's budget will also play a role in dictating how much the interest rate lever will need to be pulled.

We don't want to overstate the negatives -- there is still momentum in parts of the economy, companies are on average conservatively positioned, and household balance sheets retain meaningful buffers. But slower growth is now more likely, and the risk distribution has skewed to the downside. The chance of a policy misstep has increased.

What we're watching

Earnings. Full stop.

Australia had a genuinely strong six months of earnings upgrades heading into this period. That momentum is now at risk. We're watching closely for where cost pressures and supply chain disruptions begin to feed through, particularly across the large-cap miners and banks, which have driven the bulk of recent earnings momentum.

The good news: market valuations have reset to more reasonable territory (ASX200 & ASX300 now at 17.5x PE forward vs recent highs of 20x). That cushion matters. But it disappears quickly if earnings downgrades follow. We're not there yet, but we're watching.

How the portfolio is positioned

With genuine uncertainty elevated, this is not the environment for bold, concentrated bets. Instead, we've been making deliberate, measured tilts -- reducing exposure to emerging risks and adding to areas with more resilient earnings

• • We've taken profits in global and domestic cyclicals -- metals and mining, discretionary, and banks -- where earnings are most exposed to an economic slowdown. In their place, we've added to defensive earnings streams: Staples (Woolworths), Telecommunications (Superloop, Telstra), and Insurance (Insurance Australia Group, Medibank).

• On Energy, we remain broadly neutral but with a slight tilt toward spot-price and refiner exposure (Woodside and Ampol). Even if the conflict resolves quickly, structural damage to supply infrastructure suggests oil prices are unlikely to return to recent lows anytime soon.

• We retain a modest overweight to Metals and Mining, but well below recent highs and highly selective in where we're positioned. Where commodity deficits have genuinely widened -- aluminium being a clear example, with the supply gap widening materially since January -- we see better-supported prices and potential for more earnings upgrades (Newmont, Rio Tinto, BHP, Alcoa).

• REITs remain underweight, with a preference for Charter Hall within the sector. Its high-quality portfolio and strong balance sheet provide relative insulation in a higher-for-longer rate environment relative to the broader REIT sector.

• Our Technology exposure, while modest, stays at the defensive end of the spectrum -- businesses with durable, recurring earnings streams (Technology One and Life360).

• The domestic consumer remains at risk with demand growth clearly slowing. Both Business and Consumer confidence slumped during March'26 to levels last seen during the Covid pandemic. We're underweight the Consumer overall -- more so in Discretionary, offset somewhat by an overweight in the more defensive Staples (Woolworths).

• We've moved to small underweight on Banks, shifting exposure a bit toward Insurance -- a less beta-sensitive part of the sector. Bank valuations look stretched; ex-CBA the picture improves, but recent market moves make even a relative value argument difficult to sustain.

The bottom line

This is an autumn for patience. The macro uncertainty is real, and we won't pretend otherwise. But uncertainty is not the same as paralysis -- it's an invitation to think carefully about where earnings are genuinely supported and where they are not.

We are tilting. Slowly, purposefully. And we will keep tilting in the direction the evidence points.
As always, we'll let the earnings do the talking.

Funds operated by this manager:

Alphinity Australian Share Fund , Alphinity Concentrated Australian Share Fund , Alphinity Sustainable Share Fund , Alphinity Global Equity Fund , Alphinity Global Sustainable Equity Fund

This material has been prepared by Alphinity Investment Management ABN 12 140 833 709 AFSL 356 895 (Alphinity). It is general information only and is not intended to provide you with financial advice or take into account your objectives, financial situation or needs. To the extent permitted by law, no liability is accepted for any loss or damage as a result of any reliance on this information. Any projections are based on assumptions which we believe are reasonable but are subject to change and should not be relied upon. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Neither any particular rate of return nor capital invested are guaranteed.

10k Words

Equitable Investors

April 2026

(2-minute read)

Funds operated by this manager:

Equitable Investors Dragonfly Fund

Disclaimer

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Fund returns are quoted net of all fees, expenses and accrued performance fees. Delivery of this report to a recipient should not be relied on as a representation that there has been no change since the preparation date in the affairs or financial condition of the Fund or the Trustee; or that the information contained in this report remains accurate or complete at any time after the preparation date. Equitable Investors Pty Ltd (EI) does not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of the information in this report. To the extent permitted by law, EI disclaims all liability that may otherwise arise due to any information in this report being inaccurate or information being omitted. This report does not take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situation and needs of potential investors. Before making a decision to invest in the Fund the recipient should obtain professional advice. This report does not purport to contain all the information that the recipient may require to evaluate a possible investment in the Fund. The recipient should conduct their own independent analysis of the Fund and refer to the current Information Memorandum, which is available from EI.